Deliberation plays an important role in the design of rational agents embedded in the real-world. In particular, deliberation leads to the formation of intentions, i.e., plans of action that the agent is committed to achiev ing. In this paper, we present a branching time possible-worlds model for representing and reasoning about, beliefs, goals, inten tions, time, actions, probabilities, and pay offs. We compare this possible-worlds ap proach with the more traditional decision tree representation and provide a transfor mation from decision trees to possible worlds. Finally, we illustrate how an agent can per form deliberation using a decision-tree rep resentation and then use a possible-worlds model to form and reason about his inten tions.
INTRODUCTION
The design of rational agents, situated in a dynamic world and operating effectively under real-time con straints and resourc e limitations, has been of great interest to researchers in philosophy, artificial intel ligence, and computer science [1, 2, 7] . Such ratio nal agents have to balance the time taken thinking against the time needed for acting. In particular, they must balance the frequency of reassessment of options against continuing commitment to previously chosen plans.
Classical planning addresses only one aspect of the above problem; namely, means-end reasoning. Means end reasoning involves finding a sequence of actions that satisfy a certain end goal (or goals). However, 
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Classical decision theory, on the other hand, addresses the problem of weighing alternative courses of action and choosing the best plan of action according to some well-defined criteria, such as maximizing expected util ity. However, this theory presupposes an ideal agent who can consider and weigh all possible alternative courses of action before making a decision. In real sit uations, such an assumption is rarely valid-not only does the world undergo continuous change, even as the agent is deliberating, but the agent may not be capable of enumerating all the alternatives.
What is required for the design of rational agents is a combination of symbolic means-end reasoning and numeric decision-theoretic analysis that takes into account the resource-boundedness of rational agents [6] . One such design is provided by the belief-desire intention (BDI) architecture [2] . This architecture gives primary importance to the attitude of intentions. While most philosophical accounts of rational agency treat intentions as being reducible to beliefs and de sires, Bratman [1] argues convincingly that intentions, especially future-directed intentions, play a significant and distinct role in resource-bounded reasoning.
Bratman treats intentions as plans of action that the agent is committed to achieving. Prior intentions con strain the search for possible means for achieving the current intention and thus focus the means-end reason ing process. The notion of commitment, which lends a certain sense of stability to means-end reasoning, is balanced against the notion of reconsideration of inten tions, which lends a certain sense of reactivity. This rational balance between commitment and reconsider ation is essential for effective means-end reasoning in dynamic domains.1
Intentions play two important roles in resource bounded decision-theoretic analysis or deliberation [1) . First, prior intentions pose problems for further de liberation , i.e., prior intentions produce the decision problems that the agent needs to consider. Second, prior intentions constrain the deliberation process be cause they rule out options that conflict with existing intentions. Under this view, the deliberation process is a continuous resource-bounded activity rather than a one-off exhaustive decision-theoretic analysis.
So far, we have discussed the role of intentions in means-ends reasoning and deliberation. However, we have not discussed how the agent arrives at his in tentions. Prior intentions, means-ends reasoning, and deliberation are all involved in the formation of in tentions. By means-ends reasoning , a prior intention towards an end results in the agent enumerating all the alternative or means of achieving this end; the agent by deliberating on all these alternatives then chooses the best one and commits to it by forming an intention.
We have previously provided (14, 15) a logical frame work that describes the role of intentions in means-end reasoning. In this paper , we illustrate how the process of deliberation can lead to the formation of intentions.
OVERVIEW
BDI-architectures are formalized by defining notions such as beliefs , goals , intentions, actions, and the inter-relationships between them. We have previ ously shown how this can be accomplished using a branching-time possible-worlds logic (15) .
Briefly , the structure of our logic is as follows: Each world is a temporal structure with a branching time fu ture and a single past called a time tree (4) . A particu lar time point in a particular world is called a situation. Event types transform one time point into another. For each situation we associate a set of belief-accessible, goal-accessible, and intention-accessible worlds; intu itively, those worlds that the agent believes to be pos sible, desires to bring about , and commits to achiev ing, respectively. Multiple possible worlds result from the agent's lack of knowledge about the state of the world. But within each of these possible worlds, the branching future represents the choice of actions avail able to the agent. Moving from belief to goal to inten tion worlds amounts to successively pruning the paths of the time tree; intuitively, to making increasingly selective choices about one's future actions. This is captured semantically by requiring that for each belief accessible world there exists a sub-world which is goal accessible and, in turn, for each goal-accessible world there exists a sub-world which is intention-accessible (see Figure 1) .
In this paper, we extend the expressive power of the above logic to model the process of deliberation by introducing subjective probabilities and subjective pay offs. For the former , we adopt the formalism of Fa gin and Halpern (5) and extend it to a branching time model. For the latter, we introduce a payoff function that associates numeric values (or payoffs) with certain paths in a time tree. Intuitively, an agent at each situation has a probability distribution on his belief-accessible worlds. He then chooses sub worlds of these that he considers are worth pursu ing and associates a payoff value with each path in these sub-worlds. These sub-worlds are considered to be the agent's goal-accessible worlds. By making use of the probability distribution on his belief-accessible worlds and the payoff distribution on the paths in his goal-accessible worlds, the agent determines the best plan(s) of action for different scenarios. This process will be called Possible-Worlds(P W) deliberation. The result of PW-deliberation is a set of sub-worlds of the goal-accessible worlds; namely, the ones that the agent considers best. These sub-worlds are taken to be the intention-accessible worlds that the agent commits to achieving.
In contrast to this approach , decision theory represents the problem as a decision tree (or, equivalently, as a payoff matrix or influence diagram). A decision tree consists of three types of nodes: (a) decision nodes, which represent the choice of actions; (b) chance nodes, which represent the state of uncertainty in the world; and (c) terminal nodes, which represent the value of outcomes. Based on the category of decision making -namely, certainty, risk or uncertainty -a particular decision rule is adopted for selecting the best plan(s) of action. We shall refer to this process as decision-tree (DT) deliberation.
The main thrust of this paper is to show how decision tree deliberation can be utilized within a framework that is suited to resource-bounded reasoning in dy namic domains. We first describe the possible-worlds model and the decision tree representation formally. We then provide a transformation from decision trees to the possible-worlds model. From the possible worlds viewpoint, this provides a concrete method for obtaining the probability and payoff distribution on the worlds. From a decision theory viewpoint, the transformation facilitates symbolic manipulation of decision-theoretic entities. Finally, we describe clas sical decision-tree deliberation and show how it can be used to determine the formation of intentions.
3

POSSIBLE WORLDS MODEL
In our earlier work (15) we extended the propositional branching-time logic CTL • (4) to a possible-worlds framework and introduced modal operators for beliefs, goals, and intentions. In this section, we enhance this logic by introducing operators for probability (similar to that of Fagin and Halpern (5]) and payoffs. We now define formally the notion of an interpretation in our language.
is a set of primitive event types, T is a set of time points, -< a binary relation on time points, 2 and <I> is a truth assignment of primitive propositions for any given world and time point. A situation is a world, say w, at a particular time point, say t, and is denoted by w,. The relations, B, 9, and I map the agent's current situation to her belief, goal, and intention-accessible worlds, respectively. More formally, B � W x T x W and similarly for 9 and I. PA is a probability assignment function that assigns to each time point t and world w a probability function 11r . Each 11r is a discrete probability function on the set of worlds W. OA is a payoff assignment function that assigns to each time point t and world w a payoff function p'f. Each p'f is a partial mapping from paths to real-valued numbers. 
there exists to such that e E Ow(to, t i) M, (w,,, .. . ) f: done(e1;e2) iff there exists to such that e2 E Ow(to, t1) and
R and 'R indicate the modal operators and relations, respectively, of belief, goal, and intention. We use the abbreviation nr to denote all the worlds 'R-accessible from watt.
The semantics of temporal and modal operators is rel atively straightforward. The probability of a formula 4> is greater than or equal to a if and only if the proba bility distribution of all the belief-accessible worlds in which 4> is true is greater than a. The payoff of a for mula 1/J is greater than or equal to a if and only if the payoff function assigns a value greater than or equal to a to all paths where 1/J is true in all goal-accessible worlds.
INEVITABLE(¢) is defi ned as ..,OPTIONAL(..,¢); D¢ as ..,o..,¢. Additionally, the conditional probability PROB(¢1 14>2) �a can be represented as PROB(</>1 1\ <1> 2) � a.PROB(¢2) [8 ] .
We shall illustrate the belief-and goal-accessible worlds of an agent using a simple example. Phil, who is currently in the House of Representatives, believes that he can stand for the House of representatives (Rep), switch to the Senate and stand for a Senate seat (Sen), or retire from politics (Ret) [10] . He does not consider the option of retiring seriously and is sure to retain his House seat. He has to make a decision re garding conducting or not conducting an opinion poll, based upon which he has to decide to stand for the House or the Senate. The results of the poll would be either a majority approving his switch to the Senate (yes) or a majority disapproving of his switch (no).
Consider the current situation to be w,. The four belief-accessible worlds of w,, shown in Figure 1 , corre spond to Phil winning or losing the Senate seat based on the majority answering yes or no in the poll. The probabilities of these worlds are shown in the top right hand corner of each world. The propositions win, loss, yes, and no are true at the situations shown. Some of the formulas that are satisfiable at w1 are BEL(OPTIONAL(<>done(Sen))), i.e., Phil believes that he has the option of eventually standing for the Sen ate, and PROB(OPTIONAL(<>yes)) = 0.42, i.e., the probability of eventually achieving a yes response is 0.42.
The goal worlds are also shown in Figure 1 (for clarity, we have omitted the time points, which are the same as in the belief worlds). The values at the end of the paths (100, 200, and 300) signify the value of losing a Sen ate seat, winning a House seat, and winning a Senate seat. This can be expressed as PAYOFF(<>(done(Sen) 1\ loss))= 100, PAYOFF(<>(done(Sen) 1\ win))= 300, etc. Other formulas can state other properties of the agent's goals. For example, the goal of the agent to re tain his option to eventually stand for a Senate seat is expressed as GOAL(OPTIONAL(<>done(Sen))). Note that the option of retiring from politics exists only in belief worlds, not in goal worlds, i.e., Phil believes that retiring is an option, but does not have any goal to wards retiring.
SEMANTIC CONDITIONS
In this section, we give an informal description of some of the semantic conditions that can be imposed on our possible worlds model. Some of these conditions re quire the definition of a sub-world. We define a world to be a sub-world of another (denoted by �) if and only if the time points in one are a subset of the other, they share the same history, and everything else is identical. The formal definition of sub-worlds and the axioms corresponding to the following semantic conditions are given elsewhere [13] .
If the belief-accessible worlds represent chance, then no level of introspection can change the chance. Thus we require that all belief-accessible worlds have identi cal probability distributions (Semantic Condition C1).
We also require that the probability distribution over belief-accessible worlds add up to one (C2). From C2 we also have that beliefs about inevitable facts have probability one.
We introduce a constraint on our belief, goal, and intention-accessible worlds, called strong realism [15] . Strong realism requires that for every belief-accessible world there exists a sub-world which is a goal accessible world, and for every goal-accessible world there exists a sub-world which is an intention accessible world (C3). The same restriction can be applied in the reverse direction also (C4). These two conditions essentially ensure that, if the agent intends an option, he has the goal towards that option and also believes in that option. These semantic condi tions are very strong and have a significant impact on the inter-relationships between beliefs, goals, and intentions. We show elsewhere [14, 15] how these con ditions can be relaxed to solve some of the problems associated with possible-world representations of be liefs, goals, and intentions [3] .
More formally, the semantic conditions Cl to C4 can be stated as follows:
Vw' E B w 3w" E gw such that w" C: w' and t t -
Vw' E 9f' 3w" E Bf' such that w" !:;;; ul. (C4) Vw' E g w 3w" E z w such that w " C: w' and t t -
Vw' E I/" 3w" E 9/" such that w" !:;;; w'.
In the remainder of this paper, we shall use this possible-worlds BDI model as a basis for deliberation. 4 
DECISION TREES AND GOAL
WORLDS
In this section, we give a formal description of a deci sion tree and show how one can transform a decision tree into a set of goal-accessible worlds. Intuitively, both decision trees and goal-accessible worlds capture the desirable ends or outcomes of the decision prob lem, the diff erent alternatives or choices available to the agent to achieve those ends, and the chance events controlled by nature. Note that this intuitive map ping is possible only because we have chosen to rep resent each possible world as a branching-time struc ture, rather than the more traditional model where each possible world is a linear-time structure [3] . Al though one may be able to define a transformation from decision trees to linear-time models, we believe that such a mapping would be less intuitive than the one illustrated here.
The decision tree for our running example is given on the left hand side of Figure 3 . Decision nodes are de noted by boxes and chance nodes by circles. The for mal definition of a decision tree is as follows:
A decision tree DT = <N, £, S, PS, P, U, <I>, lji, E> . ./11 , is the union of all decision nodes V, all chance nodes C, and all terminal nodes T. <I> is the set of all propositional formulas, IJi is the set of all probabilistic state formulas (which includes the condi tional probability operator in addition to the standard logical operators), and E is the set of all primitive event types. £ <; V x ./11 x E is an event relation. S <; C x (V U T) x <I> is a chance relation. PS <; C x (V U T) x IJi is a probabilistic state relation. P: IJi .... .. � is a probability function that maps probabilistic states to real numbers. U: T --> �is the payoff function that assigns to a terminal node a real number.
Now we consider the transformation from decision trees to possible worlds. Given a decision tree, we start from the root node and traverse each arc. For each unique state labeled on an arc emanating from a chance node,3 we create a new decision tree that For all n, m such that S(n, m, s) and PS(n, m, r) collect( (t -S(n, m, s) -£(k, n, e) + £(k, m, e)), p.r )) Figure 2 : Functions for Transformation is identical to the original tree except that (a) the chance node is removed and (b) the arc incident on the chance node is connected to the successor of the chance node. This process is carried out recursively until there are no chance nodes left. Each of the deci sion trees so obtained consists of only decision nodes and terminal nodes. Each one of these decision trees is then transformed into a possible world structure by appropriately renaming the relations. The payoff func tion is assigned to paths in a straightforward way, thus yielding a set of goal-accessible worlds.
We obtain the probability distribution over the corre sponding belief worlds by associating with each de cision tree that is created a value o, which will fi nally correspond to the probability of a goal world. This probability is essentially the weighted product of all the chance nodes that a particular world repre sents. This probability distribution is finally passed back onto the corresponding belief-accessible worlds.
The transformation is performed by two functions, create and remove, which are defined in Figure 2 . We have assumed in the function remove that the chance node is connected by an arc from a decision node. This is true in all cases except when the chance node is the root node of the decision tree. We have also assumed that the chance states are named uniquely.
The create function, when called with a given decision tree, its root node, and a probability value of one, will result in a set of decision trees with appropriate prob abilities. The final transformation from these multiple decision trees with no chance nodes to possible worlds is trivial and is given elsewhere [13] . Figure 3 gives the transformation for the running example.
The possible worlds so formed are goal-accessible worlds. The probabilities associated with these worlds are the same as the probabilities of the decision trees chance states and not with respect to the chance nodes.
This is important to avoid invalid goal worlds. Transformation from Decision Trees to Goal Worlds from which they are derived. Given our semantic con dition earlier that all goal-accessible worlds have corre sponding belief-accessible worlds, the probability dis tribution flows backwards to belief-accessible worlds. This transformation yields the following proposition:
Given a decision tree DT we can create a possible worlds interpretation M such that the information given by the decision tree DT is satisfiable for a particular world y and time t in M. We shall denote this by transform(DT,<M,y , t>).
5
DELIBERATION AND INTENTIONS
Given a decision tree and the above transformation, an agent can make use of standard decision-theoretic techniques such as maximin or maximizing expected value to deliberate and decide the best plan of action. This best plan of action is what the agent commits to and adopts as an intention.
To capture the process of decision theory deliberation, we introduce two generic functions, the value function, denoted by V, and the deliberation function, denoted by 8. The value function assigns a real-valued number to every node in the decision tree and the deliberation function chooses one or more best sequences of actions to perform at a given node. Both these functions will be parameterised on the particular deliberation procedure used; i.e., maximin deliberation, maximizing the expected utility, or any other deliberation procedure. We shall use the operator ';' to denote sequencing of actions.
First we consider the maximin approach. The value and deliberation functions for this approach is given in Figure 4 . For the running example, the maximin deliberation function returns the set {No Poii;Rep, Poii;Rep}.
Next we examine the principle of maximizing expected value. For decision nodes and terminal nodes, the value function and the deliberation function using the maxexpval principle are identical to the ones under the maximin principle. For chance nodes, the value and deliberation functions are defined as:
V(maxexpval, n;) = L:{n , JPS(n,,n;,p;)} P (pj) . V(n j ) 8(maxexpval, n;) = { Sj ?; 8( maxexpval, ni) IS( n;, ni, Sj)} For the running example the above deliberation func tion returns { Poll;yes?;Sen, Poll;no ?;Rep}. Actions yes? and no? are used as conditional tests.
Modifying the modal operator INTEND with a sub script that indicates the decision procedure used, we can state the following theorem which allows an agent to form intentions based on his deliberation.
If an agent with a decision tree DT with { min {n;IS(n,,n;,s;)} V(n;) V(maximin, n;) = ma X{n;IC(n,,n;,e;)} V(n;) U(n;) if n; E C if n; E 'D if n; E T 6(maximin, ni) = { {6(maximin, n;) I S(n;,n;,s;) and V(n;) = V(n;)} {e;;6(maximin,n;) I e(n;,n;,e;) and V(n;) = V(n;)} nil if n; E C if n; E 'D if n; E T Figure To prove the above theorem, we need to defi ne the process of deliberation within a possible-worlds model that generates intention-accessible worlds from a given set of goal-accessible and belief-accessible worlds. This definition is given elsewhere [13] . The set of intention accessible worlds generated by maxexpval deliberation is shown in Figure 1 . The possible-worlds delibera tion can be shown to be equivalent to the decision tree deliberation [13] . This equivalence together with Proposition 1 establishes the above theorem.
Note that the maximin deliberation function always commits to a particular branch emanating from a chance node; namely, the branch that leads to a min imum value node. This means that 6 We believe that the formalism we have presented here is general enough to cover a wide range of decision problems. The transformation and equivalence estab lished in this paper should help one to choose the ap propriate representation for the appropriate purpose, making use of the results of one representation within the other. For example, one could operate within a possible-worlds BDI framework for reasoning about the interaction of beliefs, goals, and intentions, and how they change with time [15] , shift to a decision tree representation for deliberation, and then come back to the possible-worlds framework for reasoning about the intentions so formed. 6 
CONCLUSIONS
This paper examines one of the important philosoph ical aspects of Bratman's theory of rational agency; namely, that deliberation leads to the formation of intentions. We have presented a powerful branching time possible-worlds model for reasoning about beliefs, goals, intentions, actions, time, probabilities, and pay offs, and provided a transformation from decision trees to structures in this model. We have also shown how the deliberation procedure used determines the inten tions adopted by the agent. This formal model of de liberation within a BDI-architecture is one of the main contributions of this paper. Previous work on formal izations of BDI-architectures [3, 12, 15] does not ad-dress this issue.
Recent work in real-time reasoning has vigorously pur sued the use of decision-theoretic techniques. Russell and Wefald [16] treat computations themselves as ac tions, with appropriate utilities. These computations have to be chosen from among a number of different alternatives and decision theory is used to choose the best action or computation. This facilitates meta-level reasoning. Haddawy and Hanks [9] explore the rela tionships between symbolic goals and numeric utili ties. In particular, they address the problem of build ing utility functions. However, neither approach con siders the role of decision theory in the formation of intentions, which is the primary focus of this paper.
Fagin and Halpern [5] combine reasoning about knowl edge and probabilities by explicitly introducing prob ability formulas. Haddawy [8] introduces reasoning about probabilities in a branching time model by con sidering a world to be a future path. The work pre sented here deals with both future paths in a branching time model and different possible worlds in the epis temic sense. It also introduces explicit reasoning about payoffs and treats payoff s as values the agent places on his future paths within a goal-accessible world. Thus it builds on the existing tradition by combining a possible-worlds BDI framework with decision-theoretic deliberation and explicit reasoning about probabilities and payoffs.
Our future work in this area will focus on the role of intentions in deliberation and reconsideration. We aim to analyze the need for rational agents to recon sider intentions and when they should carry out such reconsideration.
